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Timing is Everything 
 




Since China’s application in 1987 to resume its status in the Generalized Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs (GATT)/World Trade Organization (WTO) there has been a great deal of 
debate over the timing of China’s accession.   Although most of the issues relating to the 
timing of China’s trade liberalization have been resolved, the abolition of restrictions on 
Chinese textiles and clothing may still be subject to delay if the United States and Europe 
choose to implement the safeguards contained in the their bilateral accession agreements with 
China as well as in the original Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC). 
In this paper, the effects of alternative target dates for the elimination of restrictions on 
textiles quotas are examined.  Since this issue revolves fundamentally around the question of 
timing, it is most appropriately addressed in a dynamic model.  In this study we use the 
Dynamic GTAP model.  This is applied to a 19-region by 22-commodity aggregation of the 
GTAP database, supplemented with foreign income data.  
The paper finds that timing is indeed an important determinant of the profile of structural 
adjustment required in China and the rest of the world.  In light of their interest in delayed 
implementation the ATC, it is interesting to note that our results suggest slower elimination 
of these quotas is detrimental to national welfare in North America and Europe.  
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1.  Introduction  
 In 1986, China notified GATT/WTO members of its wish to resume membership in 
that organization.  China’s application to join the WTO has aroused a number of concerns 
from both developing and developed member nations.  Some of the issues raised have 
included how China’s growth and accession will affect the world food markets (Anderson, 
Dimaranan, Hertel and Martin, 1997); whether China’s accession will further increase the 
U.S. trade deficit (USITC, 1999); whether increased competition will result in lower real 
wages for skilled and unskilled workers (Scott, 1999); and how increased competition will 
affect the development prospects of other nations in South Asia who compete in similar 
markets to China. 
 China’s bid for WTO accession has involved negotiation of individual agreements 
with key WTO members.  Upon accession these bilateral agreements will then be extended to 
all WTO members.  This long process of negotiation began in 1987.  In November 1999, an 
agreement was reached between China and the United States and in May 2000 a similar 
agreement was reached between China and the European Union.  These agreements have 
gone a long way towards removed the remaining obstacles to China’s membership in the 
WTO. 
 The main concern of WTO member states has been to secure greater access to the 
growing Chinese market.  The issues addressed during these negotiations provide for further 
market access for foreign companies and foreign investment, the reduction of tariffs and the 
implementation of bindings, elimination of quantitative restrictions, and the participation of 
China in other multilateral agreements relating to information technology, 
telecommunications and financial services (USITC, 1999).  In this paper, only the 
quantitative effects of tariff reductions and ATC implementation are examined 1.  
 An important issue in the negotiations between China and the other member states 
has been the timing of China’s accession, including: a) when China should join; b) whether 
China should be treated as a developed or a developing economy – hence dictating the 
timetable for tariff cuts; and c) when quotas on textiles and wearing apparel should be 
abolished by North America and Europe.  Under the Uruguay Round (UR) agreement, 
developing countries are permitted a longer period of time during which to implement their 
agreements. Many developed countries have argued that the large size of the Chinese market 
justifies its being treated as a developed economy and this is reflected in the final agreements 
with the United States and the European Union. 
 As China currently enjoys normal trading relations (NTR, previously MFN) status, 
WTO members are not required to further reduce their tariffs on Chinese goods. However, 
WTO membership would ensure China that these bound tariffs could not be increased in the 
future.  In the base case scenario used in this paper, it is assumed that China would continue 
to enjoy NTR status even if it were not permitted to join the WTO.  An important alternative 
scenario, where China loses its NTR status, could have been a clear possibility.  The Chinese 
                                                           
1  A qualitative assessment of the possible effects, on investment and trade, of these commitments undertaken in 
the accession agreement is provided in USITC (1999).   
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government was obviously concerned about this alternative scenario, but we do not explore it 
here. 
 China is not a party to the Uruguay Round’s ATC agreement.  Upon accession to the 
WTO China will also become eligible for the benefits obtained under this agreement, in 
particular the elimination of quotas on textiles and wearing apparel imported by North 
America and Europe from China.  Elimination of these quotas, is likely to have a significant 
impact on the quota-constrained North American and European markets, as well as on the 
other developing economies which compete with China in these markets.  This has led to 
concern by ATC importers, as well as competitor countries, about the effect of this on their 
own economies.   Yang (1996) has shown that the elimination of the quotas on textiles and 
clothing accounts for a significant proportion of the welfare gains made by China and the 
United States from China’s accession to the WTO, but it also gives rise to substantial sector 
adjustments. 
 In the agreement between the United States and China signed in November, 1999, 
China agreed to safeguards permitting a delay in the abolition of selected textile and apparel 
quotas until the end of 2008 (Gershman, 1999). The Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles 
and Clothing also provides for safeguards that might allow the United States and Europe to 
delay abolition of some quotas until 2008 or 2012 at the latest.  The effects of a delay in the 
removal of all textile and apparel import quotas on Chinese exports until 2010 is examined in 
this paper. While there is also the distinct possibility of North America and Europe 
frustrating implementation of this agreement on imports of textiles and wearing apparel from 
all sources, this is not considered in this paper.   
 China’s WTO accession therefore involves both increasing access to Chinese markets 
through the reduction of trade barriers, as well as the removal of quotas on textiles by North 
America and Europe.  Taiwan’s liberalization is also included in this analysis as it is 
expected that once China’s accession has been agreed upon, Taiwan’s will automatically 
follow.  While both the trade liberalization of China and Taiwan are included, the results 
focus on the effects of this liberalization on China.  
 A number of studies  (Yang, 1996, Wang, 1997a and 1997b, USITC, 1999, Martin et 
al., 1999, Fan and Zheng, 2000, Ianchovichina et al., 2000, Yang and Tyers, 2000, Lejour, 
2000, Zhai and Li, 2000) have been undertaken to examine the effects of China’s accession 
to the WTO.  In general, the results show that world trade increases substantially as a result 
of China’s accession.  The main winners from China’s accession are China and Taiwan 
themselves.  Wang (1997a) finds that North America and many of the other developed 
nations also gain as a result of increased exports, particularly of agricultural products.  The 
removal of quotas under the ATC agreement appears to be a significant contributor to the 
benefits accruing to North America and China.  Yang (1996) used the static GTAP model to 
examine the effects of differential timing of the accession.  He concluded that there was little 
difference between whether China was treated as a developed or developing country for the 
purposes of accession.  However, since this analysis was not conducted using a dynamic 
model, the differences in timing could not be implemented explicitly, thus making it difficult 
to distinguish between the alternative accession scenarios.  In addition Yang (1996) did not 
examine the impact of a delay in the elimination of quotas under the ATC. 
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 In this paper the Dynamic GTAP model (Ianchovichina and McDougall, 1999) is 
used to more carefully examine the effects of timing on China and Taiwan’s accession. The 
dynamic nature of the model makes it ideal for analyzing the effects of alternative timing 
scenarios.  The effects of China’s accession are examined over the period 1995 to 2020.  This 
period is divided into a number of sub-periods, allowing the shocks to tariffs and to the 
quotas to be implemented in stages.  In addition, the incorporation of international capital 
mobility in Dynamic-GTAP allows us to examine the effect of China’s accession on foreign 
investment and the accumulation of capital.      
 Two policy scenarios are considered.  The first assumes that China and Taiwan are 
treated as developed countries and therefore tariffs are reduced over a period of 5 years.  In 
this case, the ATC agreement is assumed to be implemented by 2005.  In the second 
scenario, China and Taiwan are again treated as developed countries, however North 
America and Europe do not completely remove the quotas on textiles and wearing apparel 
from these regions until 2010.   
 The results confirm the finding of earlier studies that China and Taiwan are expected 
to gain the most from China’s accession to the WTO.  These gains are greatest when the 
quotas are removed quickly.  North America and Europe also gain, and their gains are 
greatest when the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing is fully implemented by 2005.  This 
result, suggests that the political debate over the delayed implementation of the ATC with 
respect to China is inconsistent with North America’s national interests.  Accordingly we 
also explore the sectoral adjustment required of the textile and apparel sectors in the ATC 
importer countries.  Here, the benefits of delayed implementation are more apparent.  In 
addition, we consider the impact on developing countries that compete with China in the 
wearing apparel and manufacturing markets.  These competitors suffer as a result of 
increased competition when China joins the WTO.  The delayed implementation of the ATC 
agreement for China does little to improve this situation, from the perspective of the 
developing countries.   
 The paper is divided into six sections.  Section 2 provides an overview of some key 
facts about China’s role in the World economy.  Section 3 briefly reviews the model and data 
used to examine the effects of China’s accession.  In section 4 the base case scenario and 
policy simulations undertaken in this paper are outlined.  Then in sections 5 and 6 the results 
are examined.  Section 5 concentrates on the macro-economic results, while section 6 
examines the sectoral effects of China’s accession focusing specifically on wearing apparel. 
Section 7 offers conclusions. 
2.  China And The World Economy   
 Since the late 1970's the Chinese economy has undergone rapid changes.  China’s 
GDP has grown at a phenomenal rate.  Between 1978 and 1995, per capita growth in real 
GDP averaged 6.04 percent (Maddison, 1998).  In 1995 growth in real GDP exceeded 10 
percent, and according to World Bank forecasts, (Global Economic Prospects Data Base, 
1999) high growth rates are expected to continue to at least 2007.  
 Rapid growth has been fueled by a number of economic reforms undertaken by China 
since the early 1980's, including the reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers, and the 
opening up of Chinese markets to foreign investment.  Between 1992 and 1998, tariffs were 
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reduced from an average of 42 percent to 17 percent (Fan and Zheng, 2000).  These reforms 
have had a profound effect on trade.  Exports and imports have been growing at an average 
rate of 22 percent per year since 1972 (Gelhar, 1998).  This contrasts with the previous 
decade of the 60's when growth averaged only 10 percent per year.    
 This rapid growth has been accompanied by structural changes as the Chinese 
economy has shifted away from agriculture and into labor intensive manufactures such as 
wearing apparel and toys.  In 1952, agriculture accounted for approximately 58 percent of 
GDP, but by 1995 this figure had dropped to just over 23 percent.  Likewise manufactures 
has risen from 8.1 percent of GDP to 41 percent over the same period (Maddison, 1998).  
However, competition in the market for labor-intensive manufacturing has increased 
dramatically in recent years with the shift of other economies, notably South Asia, towards 
export-oriented strategies and production of labor-intensive commodities. 
 The rapid growth in China has also attracted a great deal of foreign direct investment 
(FEI). As can be seen from Figure 1, FDI sky-rocketed in the early 1990's.  By 1994, China 
accounted for 20 percent of all FDI in developing countries (Garbaccio, 1995).  FDI 
continued to grow until 1997 when it leveled off.  Figure 1 also reports the broader - and 
more volatile - foreign investment figures for China.  These include portfolio investment.  
Here it is clear that China fell out of favor in 1998, under the shadow of the East Asian 
Crisis. 
 In its most recent survey of China’s economy, The Economist explores some of the 
reasons behind the slowdown in FDI in China.  In many cases investor’s high hopes for this 
market have been slow to materialize, with the absence of a rules-based economy making it 
difficult for outsiders to operate effectively in China.  Informal relationships and corruption 
still hinder many business transactions by foreigners.  In addition, inefficient state enterprises 
still dominate many key sectors of the economy.  Quantitative analysis of these institutional 
problems is beyond the scope of this paper.  However, we do explore the implications of 
WTO accession for market rates of return to investment in China.  We find that accession can 
play an important role in enhancing China’s attractiveness as a destination for foreign 
investment.  The next section outlines the dynamic model which we use in our analysis.  It 
places international mobility of capital at the forefront, thereby providing a useful vehicle for 
exploring the impact of China’s WTO accession on foreign investment and economic growth 
in China. 
3.  The Model 
 The Dynamic GTAP model (GTAP-Dyn) developed by Ianchovichina and 
McDougall (1999) is used to analyze the effects of China’s accession.  GTAP-Dyn is a 
recursive-dynamic extension of the standard GTAP model (Hertel, 1997) which is a multi-
region applied general equilibrium model.  The dynamic model preserves all the features of 
standard GTAP, while enhancing the investment theory to incorporate international capital 
mobility and ownership.  
 The model is applied to a 19-region by 22-sector aggregation of the version 4 GTAP 
data base (McDougall et al., 1998).  A list of these regions and sectors is provided in the 
Appendix, Table A.1.  The GTAP data base is supplemented with foreign income data from 
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the IMF Balances of Payments statistics in order to track international capital mobility and 
foreign wealth.  
 In the remainder of this section some of the features of the dynamic GTAP model are 
discussed.  Sub-section 1, outlines the investment theory of the dynamic GTAP model and 
sub-section 2, illustrates how foreign ownership of capital has been incorporated into the 
model. 
3.1 Investment Theory 
 The dynamic GTAP model uses a disequilibrium approach for modeling international 
capital mobility.  A disequilibrium approach is necessary in order to reconcile the theory of 
investment with observed reality. Economic theory suggests that savings will be allocated 
across regions to those investments with the highest rate of return.  With perfect capital 
mobility, rates of return must be equalized across regions. However, we do not observe equal 
returns at any given point in time. Therefore, in GTAP-Dyn, perfect capital mobility occurs 
only in the very long run.  Investment is determined by the gradual movement of rates of 
return to equality across regions.  This is the first use of the disequilibrium approach. 
 A corollary of the capital mobility theory is that if rates of return in a particular 
country are very low, investment will fall and vice versa.  Implementation of this theory 
however leads to a dilemma.  In many cases actual investment, as reported in the national 
statistics, does not correspond to that predicted by this theory.  For example, low observed 
rates of return are found to co-exist with high rates of investment in some countries.  Such 
discrepancies can be rectified in one of two ways: firstly, the data can be altered so that 
theory and data are consistent; or alternatively, the theory can be modified to more accurately 
reflect how the world works.  In the dynamic GTAP model the latter method has been used.  
This has been achieved by incorporating errors in expectations about the actual rate of return.  
Thus investment is the result of the gradual movement of expected rates of return to equality 
across regions, but the expected rate of return may differ from the actual rate of return due to 
errors in expectations.  This is the second use of the disequilibrium approach. 
 Determination of investment in the dynamic GTAP model may be illustrated with the 
help of Figure 2, taken from Ianchovichina and McDougall (1999).  The two curves in Figure 
2 show the expected and actual rate of return schedules.  The expected rate of return schedule 
depicts the relationship between the expected rate of return (rE) and capital stock (K), while 
the actual rate of return schedule shows the relationship between the actual rate of return (rA) 
and capital stock (K).  These curves are downward sloping reflecting the belief that, as 
capital stocks increase, rates of return will fall, ceteris paribus.  The difference between these 
two schedules represents the errors in expectations (i.e. the difference between observed data 
and the postulated theory).  In any given year, there is a temporary equilibrium, global rate of 
return, rT, that ensures that global savings equal investment; this is depicted by the horizontal 
bar in Figure 2. 
 Investment in a particular year is determined by three mechanisms.  The first is the 
desire to eliminate errors in expectations, which causes the expected rate of return to 
gradually move towards the actual rate of return.  This involves the movement of the 
expected rate of return schedule towards the actual rate of return schedule (arrow 1 in Figure 
2).  In the case of China, the expected rate of return must rise to match the higher actual rates 
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of return.  Secondly gradual equalization across regions of rates of return requires the 
movement of the expected rate of return towards the temporary equilibrium (rT) (labeled 2 in 
Figure 2).  With higher expected rates of return (as experienced in China) investment and 
capital stocks increase as the expected rate of return moves towards rT.  The third mechanism 
is the equalization of the growth rates of capital over time, with all three rates of return 
converging on a long-run equilibrium rate of return, r*.  
3.2 Ownership 
 With the incorporation of international capital mobility it becomes necessary, for 
purposes of examining the welfare effects of China’s accession, to take account of foreign 
capital ownership.  In the dynamic GTAP model, regional capital is owned by both domestic 
households and by foreign households via a global trust. The saving of each regional 
household is then allocated either to domestic investment or to foreign investment. This 
allocation assumes that the shares of domestic and foreign investments are held constant, 
subject to the adding-up constraints required to ensure regional saving and investment 
constraints.  This is consistent with empirical evidence that investors tend to invest first in 
their home economies and then abroad.   
 Explicit modeling of the ownership of regional investment in China allows the 
accumulation of China’s wealth by foreigners to be determined.  In addition China’s 
ownership of domestic and foreign assets can also be tracked.  Income accruing from the 
ownership of these foreign and domestic assets can then be appropriately incorporated into 
total regional income, and hence welfare for both China and the rest of the world. 
4.  The Base Case and the Policy Scenarios 
 As noted above, the timing of liberalization has been an important factor in 
negotiations over China’s WTO accession.  A central purpose of this paper is to examine one 
such timing issue.  In this paper, the effects of China’s accession offer are examined over the 
period 1995 to 2020.  This time frame is divided into a number of unequal periods: 1995-
20002, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010-2015, 2015-2020.  
Three simulations are undertaken, one base case simulation and two alternative policy 
simulations.  The base case scenario provides a picture of what we expect the world economy 
to look like without China’s accession to the WTO, while the two policy scenarios are used 
to examine two alternative timetables for China’s accession.  The difference between the 
base case and a given policy simulation shows the effect of China’s accession under that 
particular scenario.  We now turn to a detailed discussion of each of these experiments. 
4.1 The Base Case Scenario 
 To obtain the base case scenario, forecasts of key macroeconomic variables and any 
anticipated policy changes are required.  Forecasts of the growth rates of gross domestic 
product, skilled labor, unskilled labor and population for each region were originally 
obtained from the World Bank (Global Economic Prospects Data Base, 1999), Ahuja and 
                                                           
2 Beginning of 1995 to the beginning of 2000. 
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Filmer (1995) and CPB (1999).  These were then extrapolated3 nd adjusted to obtain yearly 
growth rates for the period 1995 to 2020.  These forecasts were then aggregated to obtain the 
shocks for the each of the periods and the 19 regions used in the simulation.  By way of 
illustration, the annual growth rates used in the base case scenario for 2005 are provided in 
Table 1. 
 The base case scenario also includes some policy shocks which have already 
occurred, or which are expected to occur, during the period 1995 to 2020.  These policy 
shocks include implementation of the Uruguay Round, including the Agreement on Textiles 
and Clothing.  The UR shocks were calculated from post-UR tariff rates compiled by 
Francois and Strutt (1999).  The reduction in tariffs as a result of the UR and the enlargement 
of quotas resulting from the ATC are assumed to occur over the period 1995 to 2005.  A 
number of assumptions are required: firstly, it is assumed that China continues to be granted 
NTR status under this base case scenario.   Therefore tariffs on goods imported from China 
by WTO members are reduced in line with the UR commitments.  Secondly, it is assumed 
that effective tariffs on agricultural commodities worldwide do not fall further during the 
1995-2000 period owing to the fact that UR implementation is not expected to lead to further 
reductions in agricultural protection.4  Thirdly the elimination of quotas on WTO exporters of 
textiles and clothing under the ATC are incorporated into the simulation as reductions in 
export tax equivalents obtained from the GTAP database.  These export tax equivalents have 
been reduced gradually over the period 1995 to 2005 to simulate the effects of gradual 
elimination of the quotas and the associated rents (which are assumed to accrue to exporters). 
Because these quota liberalization commitments have been heavily back-loaded, the shocks 
are implemented as follows: only 1 percent of the initial quotas are eliminated in each of the 
first five years, then 2, 8, 16, 32, 37 percent are eliminated in each of the remaining five 
years.  So that by the year 2000 quotas have been eliminated by 5 percent, 2001 by 7 percent, 
2002 by 15 percent and so on.  This time path for liberalization of textiles and apparel quotas 
is shown in Figure 3 (Base Case -- coincides with CHN2005 after 2000). 
 In addition to the usual UR and ATC shocks, the base case also takes into account 
some of the trade liberalization undertaken by China prior to the year 2000.  China has 
already made significant progress in reducing tariffs.  Failure to include these reforms in the 
base case scenario could lead to an overestimation of the effects of China’s accession5.  
Estimates of these tariff cuts were calculated from 1996 and 1998 tariff rates obtained from 
Fan and Zheng (2000)6.  
                                                           
3 Extrapolation leads to a growth rate for China of approximately 7 percent per year in the years (2007-2020).  
Maddison (1998) estimates the growth rate between 1995 and 2015 at 4.5 percent per year, sugg sting that 7 
percent may be an overestimation. 
4 This decision was taken in light of the very high pre-UR tariffs, relative to measured protection in the 1995 
database. 
5 Using the dynamic GTAP model it was found that the cumulative difference in real GDP, resulting from 
China’s accession, was approximately 1 percentage point higher if these pre-accession tariff cuts were not taken 
into account.  
6 The shocks were obtained by calculating the percentage change in tariff rates between 1996 and 1998 rates 
and then applying these cuts to the GTAP rates in the base case scenario over the period 1995 to 2000.  
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 Technological change in the base case is calibrated using forecasts for real GDP.  An 
initial simulation is undertaken in which all the macro variables, including real GDP, and the 
policy changes listed above are shocked by the amounts forecasted.  In this simulation 
technology is permitted to respond endogenously to ensure that real GDP tracks the forecast.  
The resulting values for the technological change variable provide an estimate of how 
technology is expected to change over the period, if these forecasts for real GDP are to be 
achieved.  Having obtained these values, the base case scenario is again simulated with real 
GDP determined endogenously and technology exogenously shocked by the value 
determined in the first simulation.  The purpose of this calibration procedure is to ensure that 
GDP increases as predicted, and to establish a baseline for subsequent comparison with 
policy scenarios wherein GDP responds to China’s WTO accession.  The region-specific 
shocks to technology, which relate to non-accumulable resources, are listed in Table 1.  
Further details on the base case scenario and the procedures used to obtain these shocks are 
available in Walmsley, Dimaranan and McDougall (2000). 
4.2 The Policy Scenarios 
 In this paper two alternative policy scenarios are examined.  Each of these involves 
implementation of all the shocks from the base case scenario plus the policy simulation.  In 
both policy scenario’s China accession is assumed to commence in 2000.  The examination 
of the results, in section 5, will therefore concentrate on the period 2000 to 2020. 
1. CHN2005:  The first policy scenario involves China being treated as a developed 
economy.  Therefore. tariff cuts are expected to be accomplished by the beginning of 
2005.7  In this scenario, we also assume the quotas on China’s textiles and clothing 
exports to North America and Europe will be removed by the beginning of 2005.  
Quotas are assumed to be eliminated at a rate of 7, 8, 16, 32 and 37 percent over the 
five year period 2000 to 2005 (CHN2005 in Figure 3 - overlaps the Base Case from 
2000 onwards).  This scenario is referred to as CHN2005.  
2. SFG2010  In the second scenario, North America and the EU take advantage of 
safeguards in the original Agreement on textiles and clothing to delay the removal of 
quotas on Chinese textiles and clothing.  Thus quotas are not completely removed 
until the beginning of 2010.  Quotas are assumed to be eliminated at the rate of 1 
percent for the first 5 years and then 2, 8, 16, 32, 37 percent each year after that (line 
labeled SFG2010 in Figure 3).  The difference between CHN2005 and SFG2010 is 
shown in Figure 3 as the difference between the two lines CHN2005 and SFG2010.  
China is assumed to reduce its tariffs by the beginning of 2005, as in CHN2005.  This 
scenario is referred to as SFG2010.  The agreement reached between China and the 
United States, in November 1999, suggests that it is this scenario that is most likely to 
occur. 
 China’s accession offer was obtained from Martin et al. (2000) and is based on 
China’s offer as of August, 1999.  This offer is compared to their original tariffs for 1997, 
                                                           
7 The reduction in tariffs by China is assumed to occur in equal installments over the period 2000 to 2005.  This 




and where the binding is lower, the offer is taken as a change in policy.  In the case of 
Taiwan, the cuts are based on their announced target of 4 percent average tariffs for 
manufactures.  Tariffs on agriculture are assumed to be reduced by China in accordance with 
the accession offer, however no data were available on Taiwan’s offer for agriculture and 
therefore no shocks could be applied.  In both scenarios, the reduction in tariffs is assumed to 
occur in equal installments over the entire period.   
5.  Macroeconomic Impacts of China’s WTO Accession 
5.1. Policy Scenario 1: China is treated as a developed country (CHN2005) 
 A comprehensive picture of the global impact of China’s accession is given in 
Appendix Table A.2.  A selection of these results is reported in the first three columns of 
Table 2 below.  The results report the cumulative differences between the base case and 
policy scenario at the  
 
beginning of 2020, thus highlighting the long-run effects of China’s accession. Here, we 
trace through the major mechanisms determining the changes in real GDP, capital stocks and 
welfare.8 
 As a result of China’s trade liberalization efforts the price of capital goods in China 
declines (CHN2005: Figure 4) and capital rentals  rise, leading to higher rates of return 
relative to the base case (CHN2005: Figure 5).  Investment and hence capital stocks increase 
(7.8 percent in Table 2) relative to the base case scenario as a result of the higher rates of 
return in China, particularly in the first five years following China’s accession.  Capital 
                                                           
8 One of the benefits of the Dynamic GTAP model is its ability to track foreign ownership and the impact of this 
foreign ownership on welfare. Determining the overall effect of a policy on welfare and comparing this to the 
effect on welfare of other policy experiments is a difficult task as welfare results cannot simply be aggregated 
over time without proper discounting. Furthermore, the results are likely to be highly path dependent since they 
hinge on the shares or weights given by the initial data base.  In a dynamic model the database is updated each 
period and therefore the shares will depend on the policy shocks (i.e. the path) undertaken.  As a result the 
welfare results of two experiments are not directly comparable, as they have been skewed by the differences in 
the shares or weights applied.  By using a comparative static simulation and the same initial data base (i.e. the 
2020 base case data) for both policy experiments, the same weights are now used to calculate the welfare 
changes and thus the results can be compared directly. We thereby also circumvent the need for discounting a 
stream of period-by-period welfare measures. In this paper we use a comparative static simulation to show how 
different welfare would be, with the policy in place, in a particular year -- in this case 2020. The comparative 
static simulation is implemented as a single period solution in which capital stocks, expected rates of return, 
growth rates and foreign ownership, which were previously permitted to accumulate or respond to the policy 
shock, are now set exogenously and shocked by the cumulative difference between the base case and policy 
values.  In addition the cumulative policy shocks are also implemented.  The closure and shocks are set up in 
such a way that the resulting 2020 database from the comparative static simulation, is the same as the data base 
obtained from running the policy experiment using the dynamic model.  The changes in welfare from the 
comparative static simulation then indicate how different welfare would be, in 2020, if China’s accession were 




moves into China and Taiwan.  The owners of this capital tend to be, first and foremost, the 
residents of China, followed by investors from competitor economies (columns III a d IV in 
Table A.2), where the rate of return has fallen as a consequence of China’s WTO accession.  
Overall foreign ownership of China’s capital increases relative to the base case (CHN2005 in 
Figure 6) as a result of China’s accession.  
 Figure 7 depicts the cumulative percentage differences from the base case of China’s 
real GDP.  The increase in capital stocks gives rise to higher real GDP following China’s 
accession to the WTO. This increases over time, with the cumulative difference reaching 8.6 
percent in 2020 (Table 2).  From Table 2, we see that China and Taiwan experience the 
biggest GDP increases following accession.  North America, the European Union, Japan and 
the newly industrialized economies also gain in terms of real GDP. However, in the case of 
China’s competitor economies (e.g., Southeast Asia and South Asia), capital stocks and real 
GDP fall.  
 Despite the increased foreign investment, the surge in imports that accompanies 
China’s accession to the WTO requires an increase in exports if China is to remain in balance 
of payments equilibrium. This increase is exports is accompanied by a decline in average 
export prices, relative to those of imports and China’s terms of trade decline by 3.8 percent 
(VII in Table A.2) Other countries’ terms of trade improve, reflecting the increased demand 
for their products in China.  In Taiwan the terms of trade also improve slightly, suggesting 
that China’s accession has a greater impact on Taiwan’s terms of trade than does Taiwan’s 
own liberalization.  
 Real wages in China increase over the period 2000 to 2010 and then decline.  Overall, 
China’s wages for skilled and unskilled workers are higher in 2020 as a consequence of 
accession (2.4 and 3.1 percent respectively).  The increase in competition from China reduces 
real wages elsewhere, particularly those competing in similar markets to China. In the OECD 
countries, real wages also decline, although only slightly. 
 World exports in 2020 are almost 4 percent higher due to China’s WTO accession. 
China leads the way, followed by Taiwan and Japan (V and VI in Table A.2).  In North 
America, both imports and exports increase, however imports, driven by abolition of the 
textile and apparel quotes, increase by more.  Most of this increase in trade occurs over the 
period 2000 to 2005.  China’s competitors in the wearing apparel market (India, South Asia 
and Indonesia) experience an overall decline in exports.  
The changes in regional welfare as a consequence of the two accession scenarios are 
also reported in Table 2.  China’s large gains stem primarily from improved efficiency. 
However, the value of China’s domestic equity also rises. These gains are partially offset by 
a decline in her terms of trade (Appendix Table A4). Most other developed and developing 
economies are better off in terms of welfare as a result of China’s accession.  Only those 
directly competing with China in the wearing apparel and labor-intensive manufactures 
experience a decline in welfare – primarily due to a worsening of their terms of trade. 
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5.2. Scenario 2: North America and Europe employ safeguards to delay ATC 
implementation (SFG2010) 
 In this scenario, still reduces its tariffs over the period 2000 to 2005.  However, North 
America and the EU prevail in their desire to delay removal of quotas on textiles and wearing 
apparel, which are not completely eliminated until the beginning of 2010.  The results of this 
scenario are summarized in Table 2.  Further details are provided in Appendix Table A.3. 
Comparison of these results with those obtained in scenario 1 reveals that the gradual 
reduction of quotas on textiles and clothing over 10 years reduces the gains accruing both to 
China and to the world as a whole.  While real GDP and welfare are lower it is interesting to 
note that capital accumulation is actually somewhat higher when the elimination of quotas is 
delayed (7.9% as opposed to 7.8%). 
 Figure 4 shows the cumulative percentage differences, from base case, of the price of 
capital goods in China under the two alternative scenarios.  It is clear that the price of capital 
goods falls significantly more when the agreement on textiles and clothing is delayed 
(SFG2010).  These further falls in the price of capital goods are due to an increase in China’s 
production of other manufactures, induced by the continuation of quotas stifling production 
in China’s wearing apparel sector. 
 As a result of the lower price of capital goods, rates of return under the SFG2010 
scenario are almost as high as those obtained when the ATC is not delayed (Figure 5: 
CHN2005 and SFG2010).  Moreover, larger falls in the price of capital goods in later years 
causes the rate of return to remain higher under the SFG2010 scenario.  The higher rate of 
return on capital in those later years causes investment and capital stocks to continue to 
increase.  Not all of the other economies, however, experience the same fall in price of 
capital goods as does China under this scenario, hence rates of return and capital stocks do 
not rise.  The reason for this is that capital goods in many of the other developed economies 
are not as reliant on cheap, labor-intensive manufactures and they are making no further cuts 
to their own tariffs.  China’s exports and imports again increase under this policy scenario.   
In the case of North America, real GDP and welfare falls slightly (relative to 
CHN2005) as a result of extending the implementation of the ATC to China (Figure 8).  This 
suggests that North America’s attempt to delay the implementation of the ATC is 
contradictory to maximizing the country’s welfare.  
Eliminating the quotas on Chinese textiles more slowly does appear to assist China’s 
competitors in terms of Real GDP (e.g., India in Figure 9). However, national welfare in 
most cases falls further when the ATC is delayed (Table 2).  The reduced competition in the 
wearing apparel sector means that competitors can increase production of wearing apparel (as 
shown by the increased employment in the wearing apparel sector of India in Figure 12).  At 
the same time however, increased production by China of other manufactures (Figure 13) and 
electronics (Figure 14) means more competition in these sectors and reduced production by 
competitors (Figures 15).  The long run effect on competitors depends on whether the 
increase in wearing apparel can offset the decline in other manufactures and electronics.  In 
the case of India and South Asia where wearing apparel accounts for 11 percent of exports 
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the delay results in a slightly higher real GDP (Figure 9).  In Indonesia and the other South 
East Asian economies however, other manufactures and electronics are more important and 
the delay has a much smaller impact on real GDP.  
 The effect of the delay on foreign ownership of Chinese assets is shown in Figure 6.  
Foreign ownership increases as a result of China’s accession to the WTO, but this increase 
occurs more gradually when the ATC is delayed. In the long run foreign ownership is greater 
than if the ATC had not been delayed (CHN2005). Again it is China’s own competitors who 
increase their holdings of assets abroad most.  This is due to the decline in their domestic 
rates of return as a result of China’s accession. (We assume there are no restrictions on the 
flow of capital into China.)  
When the agreement on textiles and clothing is delayed the welfare results are lower 
for China and for the other developed economies, including North America.  Surprisingly the 
welfare results for many of the competitors also worsen (relative to CHN2005), this is due 
primarily to a further deterioration in the terms of trade.  Overall world welfare rises by 
$US61334.9 million, when the ATC is delayed world welfare still increases but by only 
$US60387 million.  
    
 
15 
6.  Sectoral Results 
 The whole idea behind the safeguards embodied in the Article VI of the ATC is to 
prevent “serious damage” to a domestic industry. As can be seen from Figure 12, even in the 
absence of China’s accession to the WTO, employment in wearing apparel in North America 
is expected to continue its historical decline to only 60 percent of current levels in the base 
case for 2020.  When China enters the ATC this trend is exacerbated so that employment 
ends up at a mere 33 percent of current levels by the year 2020.  This implies substantial 
adjustments within the sector, and timing becomes key.  In particular, how much of this 
adjustment can be achieved via natural attrition of the work force? Under CHN2005 most of 
the decline is sustained within the next 5 years – versus 10 years under SFG2010.  
 In the base case, employment in China’s wearing apparel sector is fairly constant.  
With China’s accession to the WTO and the removal of quotas (CHN2005), employment 
increases sharply during the period 2000-2005 (Figure 10).  When the ATC is delayed 
(SFG2010) the increase in employment in China’s wearing apparel sector occurs more 
gradually, not reaching the same levels as CHN2005 until 2010 (Figure 10).  
 China’s competitors are also affected by the timing of the ATC as applied to China.  
Consider the case of India.  Under the base case, employment is expected to boom in this 
industry – quadrupling by the time the quotas are eliminated (Figure 12).  However with 
China’s accession (CHN2005), growth is more gradual with only half of this increase 
occurring by 2020.  SFG2010 changes this profile considerably, with rapid growth to 2005, 
followed by a flattening out and an absolute decline as we approach 2010 and elimination of 
China’s quotas. 
 These strong swings in textiles and apparel employment have an impact on other 
sectors as well.  In China, the shift from flat growth in employment in the wearing apparel 
sector to high growth under CHN2005, and medium growth under SFG2010 (Figure 10), 
draw labor away from other manufacturing activities.  Figures 13 and 14 show the impact on 
other manufactures and electronics employment in China (cumulative percentage differences 
from base case).  CHN2005 has a marked impact on employment.  Employment in other 
manufacturing falls, relative to the base case, during the period 2000 to 2005, increasing 
again only once the quotas on wearing apparel have been completely removed.   
 When the elimination of quotas is delayed (SFG2010), production in other 
manufactures increases.  The expansion in the other manufactures sectors, as a result of the 
delay of ATC implementation, has the effect of increasing competition in these other 
manufacturing sectors and reducing prices.  This reduction in the price of other manufactures 
is obtained at the expense of the real wages earned by workers in South East Asia, India and 
Indonesia (VII and IX in Table A.3).  In China, other manufactures account for 82 percent of 
imported inputs and 21 percent of domestic inputs into the capital goods sector.  Domestic 
construction, which also relies on imported manufactured goods, accounts for 65 percent of 
domestic inputs into the capital goods sector.  The combination of the fall in the price of 
other manufactures and of construction is the primary reason for the significant fall in the 
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price of capital goods in China and sustained increase in capital obtained under the SFG2010 
scenario (Figure 4).   
 In the case of North America and the other developed countries, food and services 
production and employment tend to increase while manufacturing and in particular wearing 
apparel employment decline under both scenarios; this is consistent with other studies of 
China’s accession (Wang, 1997a).  In India, increased competition in the wearing apparel 
sector, caused by China’s accession, draws resources towards the other labor-intensive 
manufacturing sectors, such as electronics.  Under CHN2005, employment in India’s 
electronics sector increases by 50 percent over the period 2000 to 2005 (Figure 16).  When 
the elimination of quotas on Chinese wearing apparel is delayed however, labor is initially 
moved into the wearing apparel sector (Figure 13) and the full increase (50%) in employment 
in India’s electronics sector does not occur until 2010 (Figure 15). 
 These effects are also reflected in trade flows, with exports by China of wearing 
apparel increasing significantly, at least 200 percent by 2020 under both scenarios 
(CHN2005 and SFG2010).  This increase in the wearing apparel sector by at least 200 
percent is primarily due to the implementation of the ATC on Chinese exports of textiles and 
clothing to the United States and Europe. However, it is also influenced by the tariff cuts, 
which make imported intermediate inputs less expensive for exporters of manufactured 
goods. The latter effect is greatly over-stated in our analysis, since we fail to take account of 
China’s current policy of exempting exporters from many of the tariffs on imported 
intermediates. Ianchovichina et al. (2000) have recently gathered data on this subject and 
implemented these duty drawbacks explicitly into a modified version of the GTAP model. 
They find that the subsequent expansion of wearing apparel exports is much smaller when 
the drawbacks are taken into consideration. (See also Lejour (2000) on this topic.) 
 In summary, the sectoral impacts of delaying the ATC are substantial and it is easy to 
see why the timing of China’s accession has received so much political attention.  In the case 
of North America and Western Europe it becomes a question of weighing the higher 
aggregate benefits from rapid liberalization against the higher sectoral adjustment costs 
implied by more rapid downsizing of their clothing sectors.  
7. Conclusion 
 The timing of trade liberalization has been an important focal point in China’s WTO 
accession negotiations.  There has been a great deal of debate over whether China should be 
treated as a developed or a developing country.  In addition, the concerns of North America 
and Europe over the likely effects of China’s accession on their textile and apparel sectors 
have led them to negotiate in favor of allowing delayed elimination of quotas on these 
products. This paper explores the latter issue using a dynamic applied general equilibrium 
model.  Two scenarios were considered, both of which assume that China’s tariffs will be 
reduced prior to 2005.  In the first scenario, quotas levied by North America and Europe are 
assumed to be eliminated by the beginning of 2005.  In the alternative scenario, North 
America and Europe take advantage of safeguards to delay the removal of quotas on Chinese 
textiles and clothing to 2010.  
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 We find that the timetable for full implementation of the Agreement on Textiles and 
Clothing affects the expected benefits of China’s accession to the WTO in several important 
ways. Firstly, consider the impact on China’s competitors in the wearing apparel market. 
India and South East Asia, experience significant falls in real GDP and welfare as a result of 
China’s accession.  Surprisingly the fall in welfare is greater when North America and 
Europe delay the implementation of the ATC, this is due to the affect on welfare of a further 
deterioration in their terms of trade. 
 Secondly, the results show that eliminating quotas more gradually, over 10 years, 
leads to a smaller gain in China’s real GDP and welfare than would have occurred if quotas 
were eliminated according to the official timetable.  North America and Europe, the countries 
responsible for the delay, also experience lower welfare gains as a result of slower 
implementation.  Overall, world welfare in 2020 falls by $US947 million as a result of this 
delay. 
 Finally, insight into the motivation for delayed implementation of the ATC for China 
may be obtained by examining the sectoral results.  Here we see that employment in the 
North American wearing apparel sector is predicted to be cut by half in the next 20 years in 
the absence of China’s accession.  Bringing China into the WTO reduces that projection to 
about one-third percent of current employment levels in 2020.  These job loses are delayed 
(although not avoided) when the quotas are more gradually phased out.  Thus the key 
question with regard to timing is whether the diminished aggregate welfare gains to the ATC 
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Base Case CHN2005 SFG2010
 
 
Table 1  Projected Annual Growth Rates in the Base Line Scenario for the year 2005 
 GDP Unskilled Skilled POP Technology* 
North America (NAmerica) 2.6 1 1.05 0.97 0.78 
 Western Europe (WEurope) 2.61 -0.21 -0.01 -0.03 3.07 
Australia and New Zealand (AusNZL) 3.43 1.1 0.94 0.81 2.08 
Japan 2.1 -0.13 -0.62 0.13 4.98 
China 7.66 1.39 3.86 0.7 6.47 
Taiwan 5.81 0.86 1.19 0.71 1.95 
Other Newly Industrialized Economies (OthNICs) 5.57 -0.54 4.29 0.65 4.39 
Indonesia 5.37 1.29 7.24 1.17 -0.63 
Other South East Asia (OthSEA) 5.4 1.55 6.94 1.52 -4.05 
India 5.04 1.87 5.49 1.47 2.28 
Other South Asia (OthSoAsia) 5.34 2.67 5.68 1.98 -0.45 
Brazil 3.49 1.54 5.46 1.2 1.08 
Other Latin America (OthLatAm) 4.43 0.73 5.87 1.51 1.86 
Turkey 5.02 1.8 7.22 1.27 -1.49 
Other Middle East and Northern Africa OthMENA) 3.96 3.13 5.23 2.34 0.56 
Economies in Transition (EIT) 4.89 0.53 0.92 0.41 5.23 
Southern Africa Customs Union (SoAfrCU) 3.68 2.49 2.91 2.01 1.36 
Other Sub-Saharan Africa (OthSSA) 4.28 3.16 3.76 2.71 1.35 
Rest of World (ROW) 4.12 1.96 3.02 1.36 0.53 





Table 2.  Results for China’s WTO Accession Cumulative Percentage Change in 2020  
 CHN2005 SFG2010 
 Real GDP 
 
Capital Stocks Welfare 
($US million) 




NAmerica 0.03 0.03 11281.72 0.02 0 11134.05 
WEurope 0.15 0.42 13194.35 0.14 0.39 13129.62 
AusNZL 0.26 0.67 2278.326 0.26 0.66 2267.771 
Japan 0.29 0.59 6272.554 0.27 0.55 5897.416 
China 8.58 7.82 27148.78 8.25 7.91 27054.66 
Taiwan 4.39 9.1 3989.531 4.37 9.1 3990.354 
OthNICs 0.62 1.44 2439.614 0.66 1.42 2486.147 
Indonesia -1.61 -2.75 -569.561 -1.57 -2.73 -573.238 
OthSEA -1.75 -2.5 -3002.42 -1.76 -2.5 -2974.66 
India -2.53 -5.65 -4126.21 -2.37 -5.91 -4214.81 
OthSoAsia -3.37 -6.83 -2349.65 -3.17 -6.84 -2444.55 
Brazil -0.25 -0.48 -525.684 -0.26 -0.49 -535.04 
OthLatAm -1.19 -2.27 -1774.9 -1.18 -2.29 -1910.48 
Turkey -3.23 -5.04 -3174.95 -3.11 -4.88 -3098.62 
OthMENA 0.16 0.56 6508.416 0.16 0.54 6487.03 
EIT -0.04 -0.19 3411.007 -0.04 -0.2 3397.113 
SoAfrCU 0.22 0.73 748.1247 0.21 0.69 742.9333 
OthSSA -0.22 -0.02 1249.4 -0.22 -0.07 1231.574 
ROW -1.48 -2.8 -1663.53 -1.45 -2.77 -1679.68 






Table A.1: List of Countries and Commodities of the Study 
Country/Region Commodity 
NAmerica North America foodgrains Rice and wheat 
WEurope Western Europe feedgrains Coarse grains 
AusNZL Australia and New Zealand Oilseeds oilseeds  
Japan Japan Meatlstk Ruminants and non-ruminants animals 
China China Dairy Dairy 
Taiwan Taiwan Othagr Other farm products 
OthNICs 
Other Newly Industrializing 
Countries  
othfood Other processed foods 
Indonesia Indonesia bevtobac Beverages and tobacco 
OthSEA Other South East Asia Extract Mining, fish, forestry 
India India Textiles Textiles 
OthSoAsia Other South Asia wearapp Wearing apparel 
Brazil Brazil woodpaper Wood and paper products 
OthLatAm Other Latin America pchemineral 
petroleum, coal, chemicals, rubbers 
and plastics, non-metalic mineral 
products 
Turkey Turkey Metals Metals and metal products 
OthMENA 
Other Middle East and North 
Africa 
Autos Motor vehicles and parts 
EIT Economies in Transition electronics Electronic equipment 
SoAfrCU South African Customs Union othmnfcs Other trans equipment and machinery 
OthSSA Other Sub-Saharan Africa houseutils Housing and utilities 
ROW Rest of World tradetrans Trade and transport services 
  construction Construction services 
  busfinance Business and financial services 
  govservice Government services 
 
 
Table A.2  Tariffs and Quotas Abolished by 2005 - Cumulative Percentage Change in 2020 due to CHN20051.  
   Wealth Trade   Real Wages  
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X 









Exports Imports Terms of 
Trade 




NAmerica 0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.14 0.7 1.75 0.31 -0.23 -0.32 11281.72 
WEurope 0.15 0.42 0.53 -0.02 1.44 1.52 0.4 -0.11 -0.15 13194.35 
AusNZL 0.26 0.67 0.59 -0.59 1.65 1.99 1.12 -0.34 -0.46 2278.326 
Japan 0.29 0.59 1.12 -0.27 6.43 4.95 0.35 -0.01 -0.06 6272.554 
China 8.58 7.82 6.48 -1.49 35.23 39.4 -3.81 2.41 3.11 27148.78 
Taiwan 4.39 9.1 5.79 -14.05 17 16.31 0.18 2.06 3.48 3989.531 
OthNICs 0.62 1.44 1.36 -4.11 3.92 3.97 0.46 0.18 0.56 2439.614 
Indonesia -1.61 -2.75 0.39 12.74 -1.54 -0.83 0.48 -2.44 -2.5 -569.561 
OthSEA -1.75 -2.5 -0.22 6.28 -1.17 -1.11 -0.14 -1.82 -2.26 -3002.42 
India -2.53 -5.65 -5.72 163.03 -6.86 -5.08 -0.13 -1.82 -3.55 -4126.21 
OthSoAsia -3.37 -6.83 -1.34 7.46 -6.96 -6.1 -1.11 -1.48 -3.32 -2349.65 
Brazil -0.25 -0.48 0.24 1.07 -0.88 1.34 -0.34 -0.45 -0.59 -525.684 
OthLatAm -1.19 -2.27 0.16 3.32 -2.52 -1.06 -0.31 -1.29 -1.83 -1774.9 
Turkey -3.23 -5.04 -0.93 7.86 -5.24 -5.82 -1.11 -2.56 -3.45 -3174.95 
OthMENA 0.16 0.56 0.74 -0.29 2.12 1.9 2.09 -1.02 -1.46 6508.416 
EIT -0.04 -0.19 0.48 1.71 1.25 1.47 0.94 -0.82 -1.13 3411.007 
SoAfrCU 0.22 0.73 0.53 -0.94 2.04 2.62 1.32 -0.34 -0.57 748.1247 
OthSSA -0.22 -0.02 0.22 0.29 1.01 1.02 1.92 -1.23 -1.51 1249.4 
ROW -1.48 -2.8 -0.2 3.49 -1.89 -1.39 -0.98 -1.58 -2.36 -1663.53 
 
 
                                                           
1 Simulation CHN2005: Tariff reductions and ATC implemented over the period 2001 to 2005.  Cumulative differences between Base Case and Policy 
Shock at the beginning of 2020. 
 
Table A.3 Tariffs Abolished by 2005, Quotas Abolished by 2010  - Cumulative Percentage Change in 2020 due to SFG20102.  
   Wealth Trade   Real Wages  
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X 









Exports Imports Terms of 
Trade 




NAmerica 0.02 0 -0.06 -0.08 0.64 1.71 0.29 -0.23 -0.33 11134.05 
WEurope 0.14 0.39 0.47 -0.05 1.39 1.49 0.4 -0.12 -0.16 13129.62 
AusNZL 0.26 0.66 0.56 -0.58 1.59 1.98 1.12 -0.34 -0.46 2267.771 
Japan 0.27 0.55 1.06 -0.32 6.32 4.95 0.39 -0.02 -0.07 5897.416 
China 8.25 7.91 6.54 -2.04 35.12 39.48 -3.37 2.36 3.07 27054.66 
Taiwan 4.37 9.1 5.74 -14.22 16.88 16.38 0.21 2.01 3.45 3990.354 
OthNICs 0.66 1.42 1.33 -4.01 3.85 3.94 0.42 0.16 0.54 2486.147 
Indonesia -1.57 -2.73 0.36 12.71 -1.42 -0.89 0.42 -2.39 -2.46 -573.238 
OthSEA -1.76 -2.5 -0.23 6.36 -1.2 -1.14 -0.15 -1.82 -2.27 -2974.66 
India -2.37 -5.91 -6 181.54 -6.74 -5.44 -0.97 -1.77 -3.55 -4214.81 
OthSoAsia -3.17 -6.84 -1.31 7.65 -6.6 -6.51 -1.35 -1.27 -3.16 -2444.55 
Brazil -0.26 -0.49 0.2 1.05 -0.92 1.29 -0.33 -0.46 -0.59 -535.04 
OthLatAm -1.18 -2.29 0.1 3.33 -2.19 -1.33 -0.36 -1.23 -1.82 -1910.48 
Turkey -3.11 -4.88 -0.94 7.63 -4.94 -5.85 -1.09 -2.48 -3.38 -3098.62 
OthMENA 0.16 0.54 0.71 -0.27 2.06 1.9 2.07 -1 -1.44 6487.03 
EIT -0.04 -0.2 0.44 1.73 1.21 1.43 0.93 -0.82 -1.12 3397.113 
SoAfrCU 0.21 0.69 0.5 -0.87 1.98 2.58 1.31 -0.35 -0.57 742.9333 
OthSSA -0.22 -0.07 0.19 0.33 0.95 0.99 1.87 -1.23 -1.51 1231.574 
ROW -1.45 -2.77 -0.26 3.37 -1.71 -1.47 -0.99 -1.54 -2.33 -1679.68 
 
                                                           
2 Simulation SFG2010: Tariff reductions implemented over the period 2000 to 2004.  ATC implemented over the period 2000 to 2009.  Cumulative 
differences between Base Case and Policy Shock at the beginning of 2020. 
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Appendix Table A4.  Decomposition of the Change in China’s Welfare in 2020  
 CHN2005 SFG2010 
Total Welfare 27148.78 27054.66 
Allocative Efficiency 113.36% 114.27% 
Equity 24.99% 24.18% 
Terms of Trade -34.25% -34.36% 
Technology 0.00% 0.00% 
Non-accumulable Endowments 0.00% 0.00% 
Adjustment for non-homotheticity  -4.09% -4.09% 
 
